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REFORMING THE MOBILE HOME
TENANT-LANDLORD RELATIONSHIP:
THE OHIO EXPERIENCE
EDWARD G. KRAMER*
JAMES BUCHANAN**
MARILYN TOBOCMAN SOBOL***
I. INTRODUCTION
M OBILE HOMES HAVE BECOME THE FASTEST GROWING SECTOR of the
housing market. It is estimated that ten million Americans present-
ly live in mobile homes,1 and the mobile home industry is now providing
as much as ninety-five percent (95%) of the supply of new single-family
dwellings selling for less than $20,000.2 The rising price of conventional
housing is making mobile homes the only viable alternative for
homeownership by low income and other consumers.'
* J.D., Case Western Reserve Univ.; Director, Mobile Home Advocacy Pro-
ject, The Housing Advocates, Inc.
** M.L.S., Kent State Univ.; Librarian, Housing Advocates, Inc.
* Student, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University;
Associate Director, Housing Advocates, Inc.
MANUFACTURED HOUSING INSTITUTE, QUICK FACTS ABOUT THE MANUFAC-
TURED HOUSING INDUSTRY 10 (1979).
2 DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FEDERAL HOUSING ADMIN.
REPORT ON USED MOBILE HOMES 12 (1975).
1 Vondal S. Gravlee, former president of the National Association of Home
Builders, estimated that "only 4 percent of American families can afford a
median-priced home." [1980] Hous. DEV. REP. (BNA) 917. Courts have taken
judicial notice of the importance of mobile homes as an alternative source of low
cost housing. For example, the court in Oak Forest Mobile Home Park, Inc. v.
City of Oak Forest, 27 Ill. App. 3d 303, 326 N.E.2d 473 (1975), stated that:
All of the experts called by both sides agreed that there is a shortage
of low-cost housing of the type provided by mobile home parks. This
type of housing is unique in that it provides comfortable dwelling at low
cost. There is no other mobile home park located within the City and the
closest establishment of this type is near the city of Frankfort, some
three or four miles away. The courts of Illinois should take judicial
notice of this situation which has been stated as a legislative finding in
the new Illinois Mobile Home Parks Statute effective September 8, 1971.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 11-1/2, par. 711). The legislature noted the
serious housing shortage in Illinois; difficulty of new construction for
moderate and low income citizens because of rising construction costs;
depletion of existing housing by demolition and advances in the con-
struction of mobile homes so that proper regulation and licensing
thereof could contribute to quality housing for the citizens of Illinois.
Id at 326, 326 N.E.2d at 483. See also East Pikeland Township v. Bush Brothers,
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The consumers of mobile homes are generally lower income young
families and older Americans on fixed or retirement incomes. About
one-third of the mobile home households are headed by persons over
fifty-five,' while another forty percent (40%) are individuals under
thirty-five.' The median income of a mobile home family in 1976 was
$10,000, and less than one-fourth of all mobile homeowners made more
than $15,000 per year.'
Due to the limited income of this group and the successful use of in-
timidation by mobile home park operators,' mobile homeowners are
more vulnerable to arbitrary practices and abuses than are other hous-
ing consumers. The threat of eviction is more onerous and burdensome
on a mobile homeowner than an apartment tenant. When a tenant in an
apartment building is evicted, the tenant can simply take his personal
belongings and find other housing.' A mobile homeowner, however,
might suffer severe economic and financial hardship in moving his unit,
assuming other park opportunities even existed.'
Inc., 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 578, 319 A.2d 701 (1974); Bristow v. City of Woodhaven,
35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971); Anderson v. Township of Highland, 21
Mich. App. 64, 174 N.W.2d 909 (1969).
1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, MOBILE
HOME SALES AND SERVICE 30 (1979).
Id.
' Annual Housing Survey: 1976 Mobile Home Households
Income of Household Heads
Less than $5,000 ...................................... 21.8%
$5,000 to $6,999 ...................................... 11.1%
$7,000 to $9,999 ...................................... 16.9%
$10,000 to $14,999 .................................... 27.0%
$15,000 to $24,999 .................................... 17.7%
$25,000 and over ...................................... 5.5%
M edian .............................................. $10,000
ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY 1976: GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS.
I As Presiding Officer, Raymond Rhine of the Federal Trade Commission
observed that: "Because of the various ingredients in the mobile home buyer's
profile, many people believe that as a group this population is vulnerable to
abuses and is unlikely to be able to afford legal assistance when problems arise."
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRESIDING OFFICER REPORT, MOBILE HOME SALES
AND SERVICES 32 (1979).
' This is not to belittle the psychological or pecuniary hardships suffered by
apartment tenants subjected to the eviction process; rather, this argument
relates to the relative economic impact that the threat of eviction would have on
these two groups of renters.
I The economic hardships of moving a mobile home were documented by the
Ohio Department of Commerce in its MOBILE HOME BUYER'S GUIDE (1973). The
guide states that:
[DJue to their size, mobile homes are no longer easily movable. A
modern mobile home is at least 12 feet wide, 60 feet long and weighs 6
tons. They are not designed to be moved often and most manufacturers
will not guarantee a home which has been moved from its original site.
The cost of hiring a truck company to transport the home usually pro-
hibits all but short moves.
I& at 3.
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Ohio has experienced its share of this growth in mobile home living.
Ohio already ranks among the top ten states for the total number of ex-
isting mobile homes.0 In addition, the sale of new and used mobile
homes in Ohio has grown into a multi-million dollar business.' Ohio has
been slow, however, to respond to the needs of housing consumers who
choose to live in mobile homes. Not until late 1977 was there a landlord-
tenant law for mobile home residents. This article will review the
development of the Ohio mobile home landlord-tenant law and the rights
and obligations of mobile homeowners and park operators under this
law.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
When the General Assembly in 1974 enacted the Ohio Landlord-
Tenant Act, 2 it did not specifically include mobile homes within its
scope. Under the Act, the definition of "residential premises" specifically
exempted "agricultural trailer camps," but did not mention "house
trailers."" This lack of specificity was the basis for claiming that this im-
portant piece of legislation was intended to include the landlord-tenant
relationship of Ohio mobile homeowners.
The first major test of the scope of the Ohio Landlord-Tenant law in
connection with mobile homes arose in Farley v. Reynolds Village
Mobile Home Park4 in 1976. Claiming that Reynolds Village had not
fulfilled its obligations to its tenants, a mobile homeowners association
sought judicial relief. The trial court ruled that Ohio's landlord-tenant
law did not apply to mobile homes; the Sixth District Court of Appeals of
Ohio upheld the lower court, declaring:
The mere space or lot leased by Defendants as park owner to
Plaintiffs to park their mobile homes was not a "residential
premises" within the meaning of Section 5321.01(c) R.C., because
the mere space or lot was not a "dwelling unit" for residential
use or occupancy and the structure of which it is a part, and the
grounds, areas and facilities for the use of the tenants
generally.
5
10 DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL HOUSING U.S. SUM-
MARY VOLUME (1972).
" Sales of new and used mobile homes in Ohio during 1978 exceeded 13,000
units with annual sales of over 150 million dollars. MANUFACTURED HOUSING IN
OHIO 3 (March 1979) [hereinafter cited as MANUFACTURED HOUSING IN OHIO].
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.02-.19 (Page 1981).
'" The definition of "residential premises" in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5321.01(C) (Page 1974) includes a list of exemptions from the law. Specifically ex-
empted from coverage of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01 (Page 1974) were: "7.
Dwelling units subject to the provisions of Sections 3733.41 to 3733.48 of the
Revised Code." Id. This exemption referred to "agricultural trailer camps"
established to house migrant farm workers during their employment.
" Farley v. Reynolds Village Mobile Home Park, No. CVJ76-04128 (Toledo
Mun. Ct. 1976), aff'd, No. L76-100 (6th Dist. 1976).
15 I&
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In July, 1976, a tenants' organization was formed in Birchwood Manor
Mobile Home Park in Ravenna. Arthur Howard, the president of the
tenant association, received a notice to leave the premises and several
eviction proceedings began during 1976. In Birchwood Manor Mobile
Home Park v. Howard," the tenants' attorneys claimed that the eviction
was forbidden by the Landlord-Tenant Act which states, in pertinent
part:
[A] landlord may not retaliate against a tenant by ... bringing
or threatening to bring action for possession of the tenant's
premises because:
(3) The tenant joined other tenants for the purpose of negoti-
ating or dealing collectively with the landlord on any of the
terms and conditions of a rental agreement."
The park operator's attorneys, citing Farley, countered that the
courts had already declared that the landlord-tenant law did not cover
mobile homes. The trial court permitted the pleading of a retaliatory
defense. As a result, the jury found the defendant tenant not guilty of
the offense charged."s
On appeal, the park operator argued that the judge could not allow
such a ruling because Ohio law did not place mobile homes under the
protection of the Landlord-Tenant act. The Eleventh District Court of
Appeals of Ohio reversed, stating:
The key point, as to the instant case, is that the property in
question is a lot in a mobile home park. An important question is
whether R.C. 5321.02 applies to mobile home parks. . . .We
agree with the Court of Appeals of Lucas County and hold that
the parties to this appeal do not have the relationship of
landlord and tenant within the meaning of Chapter 5321 of the
Ohio Revised Code.19
With the Ohio courts continuing to declare that the landlord-tenant
legislation did not apply to mobile homes,2" the General Assembly acted
to extend the coverage of the law to this area. Despite opposition from
realtors and mobile home park operators, the legislature passed three
11 Birchwood Manor Mobile Home Park v. Howard, No. R76-1748 (Portage
Cty. Mun. Ct. 1977).
', OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.02(A)(3) (Page 1981).
,8 Birchwood Manor Mobile Home Park v. Howard, No. R76-1748 (Portage
Cty. Mun. Ct. 1977).
" Birchwood Manor Mobile Home Park v. Howard, No. 758, Slip Op. at 4-6
(11th App. Dist. 1978).
1 See notes 16, 18, 19 supra and accompanying text.
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bills pertaining to mobile home landlord-tenant relations."1 The current
Ohio Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant law22 is the creation of these three
pieces of reform legislation.
Much of the Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant law came directly from
the original landlord-tenant law for apartment tenants. The rights and
obligations of landlord and tenant were carried over to the new law, as
were provisions concerning retaliation, rent deposit, security deposit
and prohibited lease clause provisions.23 More specific protections were
needed, however, to relate to the unique position of mobile homes in the
housing market, which was clearly apparent even in the definitional sec-
tion of this law. For example, rental agreement terms in the mobile
home law had to reflect the rental of land, not a home. Thus, while the
definition sections are parallel in the two laws, only Ohio Revised Code
sections 5321.01 (D), (E) and (J) have counterparts in sections 3733.01 (M)
and (N). 4 The only other defined words of the landlord-tenant law are
21 Early in the 1977 session, House Bill 29 was introduced by Representative
Lancione. Although it finally passed in weakened form, H.B. 29 was not the final
word. Senate Bill 86 was introduced by Senator McCormick later in the year; its
stated purpose was to repeal parts of H.B. 29 and H.B. 226, both passed by the
112th General Assembly, the former to take effect January 13, 1978, and the lat-
ter on November 18, 1977. The intended purpose of S.B. 86 was to correct errors
in H.B. 29, repeal other sections and add new restrictions on rental agreements.
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.01-.20 (Page 1980).
23 A comparison of the two laws may be found in the following table:
TABLE 1
Comparison Between OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. §§ 5321 and 3733
Landlord-Tenant Law Mobile Home Law
Section Terms Section
5321.01 Definitions 3733.01
5321.02 Retaliation 3733.09
5321.03 Landlord Remedies 3733.091
5321.04 Obligations of Landlord 3733.10
5321.05 Obligations of Tenant 3733.101
5321.06 Rental Agreement Terms 3733.11
5321.07 Notice to Remedy Conditions 3733.12
5321.08 Duties of Clerk of Court 3733.121
5321.09 Landlord Apply for Release of Rent 3733.122
5321.10 Partial Release of Rent 3733.123
5321.11 Tenant Noncompliance 3733.13
5321.12 Damages 3733.14
5321.13 Rental Agreement Terms Barred 3733.15
5321.14 Unconscionability 3733.16
5321.15 Restrictions on Landlord 3733.17
5321.16 Security Deposits 3733.18
5321.17 Termination of Periodic Tenancies no provision
5321.18 Data on Owner and Operator 3733.19
5321.19 Conflicting Ordinances 3733.20
2 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01 (Page 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5321.01 (Page 1981).
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"landlord," "residential premises" and "dwelling unit." For the mobile
home counterpart law, twelve other terms were added.25
The transition from an apartment landlord-tenant law to a second law
for mobile homes was not a radical step, but one based on rights
guaranteed to tenants since the 1974 Act. Since the mobile home legisla-
tion was patterned after the earlier law, decisions based on the apart-
ment landlord-tenant law may arguably be relied upon in interpreting
the mobile home landlord-tenant law. Because this legislation created a
new and more balanced relationship between mobile homeowners and
park operators, it may be considered remedial in nature. When inter-
preting reform statutes, Ohio courts are mandated to liberally construe
their provisions in order to effectuate the law's objectives; 6 the Mobile
Home Landlord-Tenant law should therefore be given a broad and
liberal construction. Doubts about coverage or protections should be
construed in favor of persons whom the legislation was enacted to
assist, namely mobile homeowners. 7
III. PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO MOBILE HOME LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
This section of the article will review the impact of the Ohio General
Assembly's efforts to rebalance the rights and obligations of mobile
homeowners and park operators in this new legislation. Special em-
phasis will be placed on examining new rights and remedies which have
been created to protect mobile homeowners from abuse by park
operators.
A. Rental Agreements
Under the new legislation, "rental agreement" means: "Any agree-
ment or lease, written or oral, that establishes or modifies the terms,
conditions, rules, or any other provisions concerning the use and oc-
cupancy of residential premises by one of the parties."2 Using this term,
the legislature developed a series of protections for mobile homeowners.
Many of these protections do not have a counterpart in the apartment
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.01(A)-(I) and (K)-(L) (Page 1980), include
definitions of "house trailer park," "recreational vehicle park," "portable camping
units," "house trailer," "recreational vehicle," "self-contained recreational vehi-
cle," "dependent recreation vehicle," "recreation camp," "combined park camp,"
"Licensor," "Park Operator" and "residential premises."
26 Rose v. King, 49 Ohio St. 213, 30 N.E. 267 (1892). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1.11 (Page 1980) leaves no question as to this rule: "Remedial laws and all pro-
ceedings under them shall be liberally construed in order to promot.e their object
and assist the parties in obtaining justice." Id. (emphasis added).
7 Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955); Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister,
337 U.S. 783, 790 (1948); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 (1945).
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01(M) (Page 1980). This is the identical defini-
tion found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(D) (Page 1974).
[Vol. 30:57
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landlord-tenant law, indicating that the legislature did consider some of
the unique problems faced by a person owning a mobile home but rent-
ing lot space from a park operator.
Unlike a tenant in an apartment building, the mobile homeowner is re-
quired to be offered a one year lease prior to moving into the park. 9 The
obvious intent of this requirement is to protect the mobile homeowner
for at least twelve months from the economic hardships associated with
being deported, part and parcel, from the park without good cause."
Another provision of a rental agreement is the disclosure of the park
owner's and his agent's name and address.' If the mobile homeowner
signs a written lease, the document must contain this information.32
Where the rental agreement is oral, the tenant must receive a written
notice relaying this data at the beginning of the term of his occupancy. 33
Failure to meet this disclosure requirement waives the park operator's
right to receive notice of a rent deposit from either the tenant or the
municipal court. 4
Fees, charges, assessment and park rules must be disclosed in writing
to the mobile homeowner prior to any execution of the rental agree-
"The park operator shall offer the tenant the opportunity to sign a rental
agreement for a minimum of one year for residential premises prior to installa-
tion of the house trailer in the house trailer park, the terms of which shall be
essentially the same as for any alternate month-to-month tenancy." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3733.11(A) (Page 1980). For a discussion of other states' laws requir-
ing leases to be offered to mobile homeowners, see Note, Closing the Gap: Pro-
tection for Mobile Home Owners, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 105-10 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Protection for Mobile Homeowners].
30 See note 9 supra. It is interesting that the 1976 Annual Housing Survey
points out that while eighty-two percent (82/o) of the persons living in mobile
homes purchase the units, over seventy-six percent (76/o) rent the land where
the home is placed. This often places the mobile homeowner in landlord-tenant
conflicts which justify the need for this provision. The great investment in pur-
chasing a mobile home and the expenses incurred to move such a unit create a
"reasonable expectation" among the parties that the termination of a rental
agreement will only occur with justification as a matter of equity. Another possi-
ble argument supporting this position would be that the park operator by induc-
ing the mobile homeowner to move his unit on his property is estopped from evic-
ting the tenant without good cause. Ohio courts have been willing to support this
type of argument based on detrimental reliance by one party in other contractual
matters. Grove v. Ohio State University, 424 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
Gruber v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 158 F. Supp. 593, 6 Ohio Ops.2d 317 (N.D.
Ohio 1958); Murnell v. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 16 Ohio Misc. 1, 239 N.E.2d
24 (1968); see also notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
3' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.19 (Page 1978). The identical provision is
found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.18 (Page 1978), of the apartment landlord-
tenant law. For an excellent discussion of this provision in Chapter 5321 see Cam-
pion, The Ohio Landlord and Tenant Reform Act of 1974, 25 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 876, 957 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ohio Landlord and Tenant Reform Act].
32 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.19(A) (Page 1978).
3 Id § 3733.19(B).
' Id. § 3733.19(C).
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ment.5 A park operator is prevented from collecting any undisclosed
fees, charges or assessments under the new legislative scheme;" nor can
the park operator use the refusal by the mobile homeowner to pay these
undisclosed costs as a cause for eviction.17 The law permits, however,
the amendment of rules, charges, assessments and fees if a thirty day
written notice to all tenants in the park is given. Under this provision,
a park operator could possibly avoid the disclosure requirements.
Several states have attempted to avoid this problem by prohibiting
certain types of fees from being charged by a park operator. 9 The Ohio
statute does so to a limited extent by prohibiting a park operator from
charging a fee for the installation of an electric or gas appliance, ' ° or the
sale of the mobile home unless the tenant contracts for the service with
the park operator. 1 Also, the Ohio General Assembly presently has
before it a bill proposing additional specific fee prohibitions.' 2 Until the
legislature acts, the mobile homeowner can argue that specific fees,
assessments or rules which are arbitrary or without justification violate
3s Id. § 3733.11(B). For a discussion on other state laws regulating disclosure
of fees, see Protection for Mobile Homeowners, supra note 29, at 108-13. See also
Note, Mobile Home Park Practices: The Legal Relationship Between Mobile
Home Park Owners and Tenants Who Own Mobile Homes, 3 FLA. ST. L. REV.
103, 111-19 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mobile Home Park Practices]. Many states
have disclosure provisions to protect mobile homeowners similar to Ohio's. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
7009(a)(3)(e) (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.271(1)(c) (West Supp. 1979); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 140, § 32P (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.42 (Supp.
1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:8C-1(c) (West Supp. 1979-80); N.Y. SESs. LAWS ch. 973,
§ 233(f) (McKinney 1979); Wis. ADMIN. CODE ch. Ag. 125.03(1)(c) (West 1979).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(B) (Page 1978).
17 Id. The pertinent part of this statute states: "Failure on the part of the
park operator to fully disclose all fees, charges, or assessments shall prevent the
park operator from collecting the undisclosed fees, charges or assessments. If a
tenant refuses to pay any undisclosed charges, fees, or assessments, the refusal
shall not be used by the park operator as a cause for eviction in any court." Id. A
similar provision is found in the Massachusetts law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 14C, § 32J(2) (West 1978).
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(B) (Page 1978). The pertinent part of this
statute states:
No fees, charges, assessments, or rental fees so disclosed may be in-
creased nor rules changed by a park operator without specifying the
date of implementation of the changed fees, charges, assessments, rental
fees, or rules, which date shall be not less than thirty days after written
notice of the change and its effective date to all tenants in the house
trailer park.Id.
39 For example, both California and Delaware prohibit the charging of en-
trance fees into a park. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.8 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 7009(b)(5) (Supp. 1979).
40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(E) (Page 1978).
4 Id. § 3733.11(K).
' House Bill 238 introduced by Representative Healy would prohibit the
charging of either entrance or exit fees by the park operator.
[Vol. 30:57
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the present general legislative standards of "reasonableness"43 or "un-
conscionability.""
In addition to prohibiting specific fees, the statute outlaws certain
practices of park operators which are oppressive to mobile homeowners,
for example, requiring the tenant to purchase skirting, equipment for
tying down the mobile home or other equipment from the park
operator," and restricting the right to install electric and gas ap-
pliances.46 Similar to this is the prohibition against requiring the mobile
homeowner to use the services of either the park operator or any other
person as a condition or prerequisite of entering into a rental agree-
ment.4" This provision protects the mobile homeowner from facing
outrageous costs for services which could not be avoided if the mobile
homeowner desired to rent from the park operator.
The Ohio General Assembly, following the 1974 Apartment Landlord-
Tenant Act, has prohibited a rental agreement from containing four
specific types of clauses. 9 The clauses outlawed by the act are: (1) a war-
s OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(C) (Page 1978).
,4 Id. § 3733.16.
Id. § 3733.11(D). However, the provision does not prevent the park operator
from determining "by rule the style or quality of such equipment to be purchased
by the tenant from a vendor of the tenant's choosing, provided that the equip-
ment is readily available to the tenant." Id. This same type of provision is in
many state mobile home laws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 7009(a)(1)(j) (Supp.
1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.281(1) (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4061
(Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 32L(3) (West 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:8C-2(a) (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 973, § 233(f)(3)(a)
(McKinney 1979); WiS. ADMIN. CODE ch. Ag. 125.04(a) (West 1979).
46 Similar restrictions are found in other states, but hold the park operator to
a "reasonable" standard. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233 (Supp 1980). See Miller v.
Valley Forge Village, 43 N.Y.2d 626, 403 N.Y.S.2d 207, 374 N.E.2d 118 (1978).
, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(G) (Page 1978).
48 This type of practice has been well documented. See Center for Auto Safety,
Mobile Homes: The Low-Cost Housing Hoax (Grossman Publishers, New York
1975) [hereinafter cited as Low-Cost Housing Hoax].
Often parks will permit companies that sell, service, and repair ac-
cessories (awnings, utility sheds, etc.) to do business in the park only if
they agree to kick back a part of their take to the management. The cost
of this kickback to the outside businessman is of course passed on to the
tenant. Walter Sanders, the president of Dearborn (Michigan) Mobile
Skirting, writes:
In all but a few parks, we are not allowed admittance
because they have their own preferred dealership. If they let us
in, as in Holiday Woods in Bellville, Mich., I have to pay the
manager $35 for each skirting job .... The kickbacks I have to
pay mean higher prices to the consumer.
Id. at 73.
" For an excellent analysis of these provisions in regards to Ohio chapter
5321, see Ohio Landlord-Tenant Reform Act, supra note 31, at 950-55. In that
these provisions are identical in both statutes, the extensive legal analysis and
decisional matter in this article apply equally to the mobile home statute.
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rant of attorney to confess judgment;"0 (2) payment of attorney fees for
either the tenant or park operator;"1 (3) exculpatory or indemnification
clauses attempting to limit the park operator's liability; 2 and (4) the of-
fer of renting without cost to the mobile homeowner in exchange for the
releasing of the park operator's obligations under Ohio Revised Code
section 3733.10.
53
Possibly the most important provision relating to the rental agree-
ment is the general prohibition that neither the mobile homeowner nor
the park operator can modify or waive any requirement imposed by the
law.54 The only exception to this otherwise total prohibition is that the
park operator can undertake the mobile homeowner's obligations under
section 3733.101 of the Ohio Revised Code.5
B. Obligations of Park Operators
A comparison of the park operator's responsibilities and duties under
the Ohio Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act5" with those of landlords
under the Ohio Tenant-Landlord Act57 reveals the former's reliance on
the latter as well as the Ohio legislature's failure to recognize, in some
instances, the hybrid nature of mobile home ownership.58 For example,
the owner of a mobile home is renting, probably on a monthly leasehold,
50 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.15(B) (Page 1978).
51 Id. § 3733.15(C).
52 Id. § 3733.15(D).
51 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.15(E) (Page 1980).
1 This prohibition flows from two sources. First, under § 3733.11(L) the
statute provides that:
A park operator and a tenant may include in a rental agreement any
terms and conditions, including any term relating to rent, the duration
of an agreement, and any other provisions governing the rights and
obligations of the parties that are not inconsistent with or prohibited by
sections 3733.09 to 3733.20 of the Revised Code or any other rule of law.
OHIO REV. ANN. § 3733.11(L) (Page 1980). An even more specific reference is
made under § 3733.15(A) which states: "No provision of sections 3733.09 to
3733.20 of the Revised Code may be modified or waived by any oral or written
agreement except as provided in division (F) of this section." OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3733.15(A) (Page 1980). These two provisions are very important because
of the unequal bargaining positions between mobile homeowners and park
operators. Except for this prohibition, park operators could require mobile home-
owners to waive their rights under the statute as a condition of renting from
them. This would make a sham of all the protections under the law.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.15(F) (Page 1980).
56 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10 (Page 1980).
See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page 1980).
The similarities in both laws goes far beyond just these two sections. For
example, compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.16 (Page 1980) and 3733.18 (Page
1980) on security deposits, or §§ 5321.13 and 3733.15 on prohibited clauses in
leases, each pair of sections being identical.
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the land from which the home cannot be removed without incurring
significant damage. 9
Any review of mobile home park operator's responsibilities must
begin by analyzing the state licensing procedures for house trailer
parks.60 These procedures have been modified numerous times since
first going into effect in 1953.1 The Ohio Public Health Council has the
"exclusive power to make rules of general application throughout the
state governing the issuance of licenses, location, layout, construction,
drainage, sanitation, safety, tiedowns, and operation of house trailer
parks."6  Using this statutory authority, the Council has adopted ap-
plication requirements and licensing procedures.
The Public Health Council has adopted an application procedure re-
quiring that prior to either creating or adding to a mobile home park,
the plans for such a facility must be approved by the agency or its
designated health district. 3 This plan, once approved, arguably takes on
the nature of a social contract between the State and the park operator
with the tenant as a third party beneficiary. The State is providing the
park operator a limited monopoly to rent lot spaces for mobile homes so
long as the operator meets the statutory and regulatory standards. 4 If
the plan is not followed, the violation is actionable.15 The plan describes
5 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
o Under Chapter 3733, mobile home parks are referred to as "house trailer
parks." This term is anachronistic and relates to the time when mobile homes
were vehicles pulled by a person's automobile. The continued use of this term
reflects the latent prejudice still existing against the establishment of such
facilities.
61 The effective date for the original Chapter 3733 was October 1, 1953. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01 (Page 1980) (History).
62 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.02(A) (Page 1980).
63 OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-05 (1980).
Because local restrictions in effect require a mobile home owner to rent
land, the park owner has a preeminent place in this housing market. Al-
most half of all mobile homes are located in parks, which often have
waiting lists of prospective residents. The established park owner can
usually depend upon the community to keep competition away.
Note, The Community and the Park Owner versus the Mobile Home Park Resi-
dent: Reforming the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 52 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 810,
812 (1972); see Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972). See also discussion at
note 30 supra.
" Under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(B) (Page 1980), mobile home tenants
are authorized to sue for actual damages, obtain injunctive relief to prevent the
recurrence of public health council rules being violated and, if the plaintiffs ob-
tain a judgment, reasonable attorney fees. This is a statutory recognition of a
private right of action. Even when not so specifically provided, an implied private
right of action will exist under a statute by the intended beneficiary when the
following standard is satisfied:
(a) whether plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," (b) whether the legislative history shows any in-
tent to deny or grant a private remedy, (c) whether implying a private
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the total area to be used for mobile home park purposes including the
plot plan, location, number and sizes of lots, location and design of
buildings, the internal street system and parking areas, the provisions
for electrical distribution system and lighting, fire protection, sanitary
sewerage and water distribution system, and solid waste collection and
storage." The plan's detail thus defines both what is the duty of the
park operator to provide and what is a reasonable expectation of the ten-
ant. The obligation of the park operator to comply with health council
rules must begin with his fulfillment of the conditions contained in the
approved submitted plan. 7
Licensing of mobile home parks is required on an annual basis and is
required on or before the first day of January. The initial and subse-
quent license issuances require an inspection relative to compliance
with Ohio Revised Code sections 3733.01 to 3733.08"6 and the rules
adopted thereunder.69 The health district responsible for licensing is
subject to inspection itself by the Director of the Department of Health
to determine if the district is in "substantial" compliance"0 with code re-
quirements, and that finding will put the health district on an approved
list. The district's failure to qualify will cause the Director to collect all
fees until the district is returned to the approved list. Fees are deter-
mined by the mobile home capacity of the park.7'
Failure to comply with any rule adopted by the public health council
remedy would be consistent with the underlying legislative scheme and
(d) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state
law.
Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980
(1979).
In addition there is an enforceable contract by the third party beneficiary, the
mobile homeowner, in the implied contract between the state and park operators.
Enforceable rights under a theory of contract, if the contract was made to insure
the health and welfare of tenants, may issue from the licensing powers of the Ohio
Health Council. The license certifies that the park operator has complied with
regulations affecting health and safety promulgated by the council which is a
creature of a state agency, The Department of Health. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.34 (Page 1980). To paraphrase the court in Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261,
1271 (7th Cir. 1981), if the mobile home tenants are not the primary beneficiaries
of a program designed to preserve and improve the public health in mobile home
parks, the legitimacy of the program is placed in grave doubt. The importance of
these legal alternatives relates to the limited powers of the Health Council to en-
force its regulations without revoking licenses which, in closing the park, may
punish the mobile home tenant more than the park operator. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3733.05 (Page 1980). See generally, Jones, Legal Protection of Third Party
Beneficiaries: On Opening Courthouse Doors, 46 CINN. L. REV. 313, 329-31 (1977).
66 OHIO AD. CODE § 3707-27-06 (1980).
67 OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-05(B) (1980). This regulation states in no uncer-
tain terms: "A mobile home park shall be constructed in accordance with approved
plans." Id.
66 See Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.01-.08 (Page 1980).
6 Id. § 3733.03(B).
70 Id. § 3733.031.
7' I& § 3733.031(B.
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"may" result in a refusal to grant a license, or the suspension or revoca-
tion of a license." This ultimate sanction would revoke the park
operator's right to rent lots for mobile homes;" it would also force his
present tenants to move from the park causing severe hardships to
them. Thus, the local health districts have been reluctant to use this
harsh sanction.
A review of the duties imposed by the Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant
law emphasizes the complementary nature of the Public Health Council
rules and the statutory responsibilities of the park operator. The initial
requirement under section 3733.10(A) of the Ohio Revised Code 7' is that:
"A park operator who is a party to a rental agreement shall: (1) Comply
with the requirements of all applicable building, housing, health and
safety codes which materially affect health and safety and rules of the
public health council."7 This does not necessarily create divergent local
standards for park operators, as in the case of landlords under Ohio
Revised Code section 5321.04." Local governments have attempted to
impose additional requirements upon mobile home parks. The Ohio
courts, however, have resisted these efforts, finding that the Ohio
legislature has preempted this regulatory field. 77 The pre-eminence of
72 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.05 (Page 1980). The statute gives discretion to
the licensor of the local district to revoke the park operator's license. The agency,
however, cannot decide in an arbitrary or capricious way whether to take this ac-
tion. See Citizens Organized to Defend the Government, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F.
Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
71 OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-02(B) (1980). The advantage of health council rules
to further define park operator and tenant obligations should be viewed in the
context that the tenants in question, the mobile homeowners, cannot readily
apply the constructive eviction doctrine when faced with hazardous conditions.
'4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(A) (Page 1980).
75 Id.
76 See the discussion of community imposed landlord obligations in Ohio
Landlord-Tenant Reform Act, supra note 31, at 885-93.
77 Noland v. Sharonville, 40 Ohio App. 2d 7, 211 N.E.2d 90 (1964); but see
Anderson v. Brown, 13 Ohio St. 2d 53, 233 N.E.2d 584 (1968). However, this may
be open to question again because of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.20 (Page 1980),
which states in pertinent part:
No municipal corporation may adopt or continue in existence any or-
dinance that is in conflict with sections 3733.09 to 3733.20 of the Revised
Code, or that regulates those rights and obligations of parties to a rental
agreement that are regulated by sections 3733.09 to 3733.20 of the
Revised Code. Sections 3733.09 to 3733.20 of the Revised Code do not
preempt any housing, building, health or safety codes of any municipal
corporation.
Id. (emphasis added).
By rules of statutory construction, the more recent legislation controls. It is
arguable that the legislature has opened the door for local governments to enact
codes stricter than state-mandated codes without being in conflict with the latter.
There is no question that the state has not pre-empted a local government's
power through zoning to prohibit the creation of a mobile home park in their
jurisdiction. See Trustees of Brunswick Township v. Riddell, 58 Ohio Op. 380
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these local codes is limited to those provisions that materially affect
health and safety," but not to the Public Health Council rules which are
to apply in toto. Thus, the standards being imposed under this provision
relate to state-wide codes, not those locally promulgated."9
The obligation of park operators to keep premises in a fit and
habitable condition, while phrased similarly to the companion provision
for apartment landlords, is somewhat confused by the conflicting defini-
tions of "premises."8 It may be argued that application of a standard of
habitability usually associated with apartment rentals is inappropriate;
yet the rights and remedies associated with the implied warranty of
habitability8 need not be lost because of this conflict. Health council
11 The determination of material effect will rest on the seriousness of the con-
dition and the duration of its existence. See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462
P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 HAw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
" See Greenlawn Trailer Sales Co. v. Board of Bldg. Standards, 51 Ohio App.
2d 161, 367 N.E.2d 887 (1976). The advantages of specificity and a uniform stan-
dard that is provided by the incorporation of Public Health Council provisions
may be diluted because these rules are interpreted by local health districts in
Ohio's eighty-eight counties. There are significant numbers of references whose
generality will allow broad interpretation. For example, the rules speak to a
"pleasing and well-kept appearance" in discussing site requirements (OHIO AD.
CODE § 3701-27-07 (1980)) or "safe, passable condition" in describing mobile home
park streets (OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-09 (1980)). In addition, the licensor "may
suspend" (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.05 (Page 1980)) or make a "resurvey when
in his opinion a resurvey is necessary .. " (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.031
(Page 1980)) (emphasis added). In order to overcome the inconsistent enforcement
of local agencies or their limited investigative capabilities, an administrative
complaint may be necessary.
'0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.01(C) (Page 1981) defines residential premises
as a dwelling unit; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01(C) (Page 1980) defines the
same term to mean "a lot located within a house trailer park and the grounds,
areas, and facilities contained within the house trailer park for the use of tenants
generally or the use of which is promised to a tenant." Id.
"' There are at least 20 jurisdictions which have expressly or impliedly em-
braced the implied warranty of habitability. See Green v. Superior Court of City
and County of San Francisco, 10 Cal.3d 616, 517 P.2d 1185, 111 Cal. Rptr. 721
(1974); Hall v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 641, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 C'al. Rptr. 661 (1972); Tonetti v.
Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Morbeth Realty Co. v. Velez, 73
Misc.2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973); Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc.2d 15,
318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1971); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund
v. MacArthur, 51 Haw. 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Timber Ridge Town House v.
Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (1974); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Real-
ty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v, Little, 50
Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Glyco
v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Ops. 2d 227, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972); Presson v. Mountain States
Properties Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 176, 501 P.2d 17 (1972); Tucker v. Crawford, 315
A.2d 737 (Del. 1974); Gable v. Silver, 258 So.2d 11 (Fla. App. 1972); Queensbury v.
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rules can provide the standard that is appropriate to apply to a lot,
grounds, areas and facilities that a park operator rents to his tenants.
Failure to meet the standard should give rise to all the relief that the
statute provides.
2
As defined by health council rules, the size and location of the lot
areas are prescribed on a sliding scale depending on the age of the park
or the section of the park where it is located. Similarly, the distance be-
tween homes, access to public thoroughfares, and provision of paved
parking, patio, pad and walkways are determined by the park construc-
tion date. 3 These requirements are both specific as to what is required
and as to whom the responsibility accrues. Defining boundaries of the
lot and the proper placement of the mobile home is the responsibility of
the park operator.4
Tiedown provisions are legitimately a factor of fit and habitable
premises. The rule requires the securing of the tie-downs of every
mobile home manufactured with tie down equipment." This provision
makes the park operator responsible to the extent that he "shall re-
quire" this to be accomplished within 30 days after the placement of the
home upon a lot.8" The obligations of tenants do not include a provision
regarding fit and habitable premises, but only for keeping that part of
the premises that he occupies and uses safe and sanitary.87 This wording
suggests a maintenance responsibility 6nly. The park operator's respon-
siblity is broader, however, because he is required to "do whatever is
reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable
Patrick, POVERTY L. REP. (CCH) 15,803 (El Paso County Court, Colo. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974);
Poisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan.
329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973).
82 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(B) (Page 1980).
83 OHio AD. CODE § 3701-27-08 (1980).
Mobile Home Lots
prior to prior to after
1/1/61 7/1/71 6/30171
Lot area, in square feet 1250 1800 3600
Distances from public roads,
in feet 10 15
Distances from park roads, in
feet 5 10
Distance from lot line, in feet 5 10
Distance between sides of
homes, in feet 15 20
Distance between ends/sides of
homes, in feet 10 15
Distance between ends of
homes, in feet 5 10
OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-08(H) (1980).
85 See also Ohio Building Code §§ BB-77-11 through BB-77-11.07.
88 OHIo AD. CODE § 3701-27-082 (1980).
87 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(A)(1) (Page 1980).
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condition."8 The tenant's obligation to comply with health council rules89
may appear to legitimize the transfer of this responsibility to tenants." If
this transfer of responsibility is done under the color of the tenant
obligation but without prior notice, it may be possible to attack this
practice as a deceptive act under Ohio Revised Code section 1345.0291 or
as an unconscionable act under section 1345.0392 when the park operator
is also the dealer selling the home to the tenant. It is arguable that
failure to disclose necessary" and expensive items is deceptive per se
under this statute. 4
's OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(A)(2) (Page 1980) (emphasis added).
'9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(A)(3) (Page 1980).
90 A common practice is for the park operator to be silent on this requirement
when the mobile homeowner assumes occupancy, and then notify the tenant after
30 days that they are in violation of a health council rule. With the onus placed
squarely upon the tenant, the park operator offers to rectify the problem by
securing the tiedowns for a fee, often as high as $300. This scenario is based on
actual complaints of mobile homeowners in Ohio who utilized the statewide
hotline operated by Housing Advocates, Inc. Seven complaints regarding forced
purchases of tiedowns were received, including two where the park operator had
previously cut them and still insisted that the mobile homeowner pay a fee for
their replacement.
"1 Protection from unreasonable rules under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11
(Page 1980), or unconscionable clauses in a rental agreement under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3733.16 (Page 1980), could provide relief from this park operator
practice.
92 See Brown v. Market Development, Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 70 Ohio Ops. 113
(C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1974).
11 It is not uncommon for an insurer to threaten policy cancellation in the
absence of tiedowns. Following some tornado activity in Ohio during the summer
of 1980, this threat was frequently reported to the statewide hotline.
94 Commonwealth v. Decotis, No. 19535 in Equity (Mass. Super. Ct., Essex
Cty., Dec. 4, 1973), was an action under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act against a mobile home park and sales organization. The court held that the
imposition of a resale fee, which amounted to little more than a shakedown,
violated the Act because of a lack of prior disclosure. The court held the resale
fee per se unlawful in such circumstances, whereas it was unreasonable and un-
conscionable. A permanent injunction issued, prohibiting the charging of any
resale fees and requiring restitution of all resale fees received since 1965. The
court stated:
If there be a public policy to protect tenants who rent a home or an
apartment from a landlord who owns both the land and the building
thereon, how much more should the law protect the owner of a mobile
home .... [U]nder the agreements introduced into evidence, the landlord
can toy with the tenant on a month-to-month basis and is able to extract
fees-some of which are never mentioned until demanded and others are
in amounts which are outrageous and unconscionable.
Id. This case does not prohibit the park owner from simply requiring the tenant
to move the home, and therefore may be a pyrrhic victory. For a further discus-
sion of what constitutes unconscionability and its application where there is an
absence of equitable bargaining power, see Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform:
Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARIz. L. REV. 91 (1974), and discussion
at notes 218-23 infra and accompanying text.
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The health council rules governing mobile home connections" for
sewerage may further define the park operator's responsibility relating
to the fitness and habitability of the premises, making delegability ques-
tionable. The rule requires the park operator "to supervise the installa-
tion of the sewer connection"9 to avoid surface discharge or odor. The
statement that park operators need only "supervise" may imply that the
duty to install may be transferred to the mobile homeowner, but. the obli-
gation to install should be that of the park operator only.
The responsibility of a landlord to maintain common areas is a function
of his control. 7 The range of responsibilities for a park operator run
from site conditions to insect control. The only issue is the standard to
be applied to this duty to keep the common premises in a safe and
sanitary condition. Again, the incorporation of health council rules pro-
vides extensive and specific requirements that can supply that stan-
dard. The health council rules that may reasonably be considered as fac-
tors regulating safe and sanitary conditions include the requirement
that "the park site is to be well drained, remote from public hazards,
and present a pleasing and well-kept appearance.""
Like the provisions governing lot area, there is an adjustable stan-
dard for paving that accommodates the age of the mobile home park. '
Paved streets after June 30, 1971, have minimum width requirements
that range from twenty feet if they are one way streets with parking on
one side, to thirty-five feet if they are two way streets with parking on
both sides. Another part of this rule directs that these streets "shall be
maintained in a safe, passable condition at all times."'0 ' As under Ohio
Administrative Code section 3701-27-08," '° there is no declaration that
" OHIo AD. CODE § 3701-27-19 (1980).
6 Id. (emphasis added).
17 Under the common law the landlord's duty regarding common areas arose
from his duty regarding those portions of the premises over which he exercises
control. In premises occupied by two or more tenants, the law inferred this con-
irol over portions of the premises used in common by the tenants. Cooper v.
Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 85 N.E.2d 545 (1949).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(A)(3) (Page 1980).
" Omo AD. ConE § 3701-27-07 (1980).
' OHio An. ConE § 3701-27-09 (1980). The provisions can be summarized as
follows:
Streets, Walkways, Auto Parking
prior to prior to after
1/1/61 7/1/71 6/30/71
Lot shall abut street by this
width, in feet 20 25 paved
Paved patio of 100 square feet x
Paved pad, strips or piers x
Paved walkway of two feet x
On lot parking spaces for two
cars x
'0' OHio AD. CODE § 3701-27-09(J) (1980).
'02 Omo AD. CODE § 3701-27-08 (1980).
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this maintenance responsibility is that of the park operator. To the ex-
tent that most of the above relates to common areas, however, there
should be no argument regarding park operator responsibility. In rela-
tion to safety, park streets must be lighted at night by not less than
three-tenths foot candle of artificial light."0 3 Providing for these street
lights is the park operator's responsibility.104
Plumbing facilities are to be provided if homes lacking such facilities
are accommodated in the park. They are to be well lit and maintained
and located within two hundred feet of these homes, and there is to be
one for every fifteen mobile homes lacking complete plumbing facilities.
Where laundry facilities are provided by the park operator, there need
only be one such facility, though separate from the toilet, lavatory or
bath fixtures."'
There are several health council rules relating to controlling vermin.
For example, when insects are present, windows and doors of all park
buildings must be screened; the park is to be kept reasonably free of
flies and mosquitoes at all times. Also, the park operator must remove
conditions fostering rats and mice.' 6
After June 30, 1971, recreation space must consist of at least eight
percent (8%) of the gross mobile home park area. When provided,
facilities and buildings for recreation must meet applicable state and
local regulations, be appropriate for the intended use and be properly
operated and maintained.'1
7
The determination of whether the level of maintenance is satisfactory
for all these facilities is at the discretion of the local health district.
100
This permits flexibility concomitant with promoting differing standards
depending on the agency acting as the licensor.
A park operator's responsibility for provision and maintenance of
essential utilities is part of the dominance he enjoys in this landlord-ten-
ant relationship. The degree to which the park operator's responsibility
limits or eliminates government regulation is cause for concern.
Public health council rules exist for regulating the water supply
systems,' including outlets." Outlet requirements include size of
pipe,"' and adequate protection against freezing and location of lines;"
provisions for the sewage system are similar."3 The rules governing
'03 OHiO AD. CODE § 3701-27-10 (1980).
'o, OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-24 (1980).
OHiO AI). CODE §§ 3701-27-16, 3701-27-18 (1980).
,00 OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-22 (1980).
07 OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-26 (1980).
,os OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-27 (1980).
'o OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-12 (1980).
,,0 OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-13 (1980).
. Water service pipes installed before June 1, 1979, must be one-half inch in
diameter, and after that date, three-quarter of an inch in diameter. Id.
" OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-14 (1980).
OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-18 (1980).
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solid waste, including its collection and storage, are very detailed
regarding containers and frequency of collection."4 Electrical systems
must satisfy the National Electric Code, local codes and approved
plans."5
The responsibilities of the park operator can result in additional profit
for him and further loss of rights of the mobile homeowner by removing
from the state regulatory agencies supervision over utility service. Park
operators frequently require their tenants to access heating oil and
similar necessities from a park-provided source."' This effectively
removes any state control over rates charged, leading to possible
abuse."7 The park operator's control over access to the park itself can
deny or obstruct access by competing fuel suppliers. This increasing
dependency of mobile homeowners on the park operator through the
supply of essential fuel creates an additional barrier to registering com-
plaints or forming tenant organizations.
Where the law provides some protection against arbitrary increases
in fees, charges for basic fuels and their increases may be subject to
these same restrictions. Some relief from abuse may be found through
the thirty (30) day notice requirement of section 3733.11 of the Ohio
Revised Code"' governing rental agreements, or by application of the
Consumer Sales Practice Act, section 1345.03, ,19 relating to uncons-
cionable sales practices. The park operator's right to make charges may
be contractually limited if the agreement with the utility company
denies the park owner the right to resell the electricity at a profit.' 0
This practice may also violate federal or state antitrust laws. 2'
The provision dealing with park operator abuse of right of access
under the Mobile Home Tenant-Landlord Act, by its similarity to the
provision for apartments, creates confusion over the extent of authority
possessed by the park operator.' The park operator is required by
14 Containers must be rust-resistant, watertight, nonabsorbant and easily
washable. Their number must be sufficient to hold all solid wastes accumulated
between collections. Collections must be at least once each week. OHIO ADM.
CODE § 3701-27-20 (1980).
OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-20 (1980).
" In Ohio the rates that an operator of a mobile home park charges his
tenants for electricity which he remeters and resells to them are not subject to
the jurisdiction of the state public services commission.
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11 (Page 1980), prohibits operators from re-
quiring a tenant to use the services of the park operator or any other specific per-
sons for the purchase of equipment or the installation of appliances or the mobile
home itself, but does not specifically limit a park operator from creating a
monopoly over the supply of an essential utility.
', OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11 (Page 1980).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Page 1979).
, See LaNasa v. New Orleans Public Service, 223 La. 548, 66 So.2d 332 (1953).
' C. F. Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1980).
112 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10 (Page 1978), Obligations of park operator,
uses the term "residential premises." Section 3733.101, Obligations of tenant,
uses the term "premises." Section 3733.01, Definitions, defines residential
premises to mean "a lot located within a house trailer park .. " Id.
1981]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
statute not to abuse his right of access. The notice requirements and
emergency provisions under this section refer to "entry onto the
residential premises," '123 and seem to recognize the proposition that the
object is only a piece of land and not the structure located upon it, as
the definition under Ohio Revised Code section 373312' specifies. The cor-
ollary provision under section 3733.101, '25 Obligations of Tenant, further
extends access of the park operator to enter the mobile home for the
purpose of inspecting utility connections. The limited purpose of this
authority should be noted; in practice, this provision is often used by
park operators to demand that tenants provide them with keys to their
owned units, regardless of the limits set by the definition of residential
premises in the statute. This is not mandated under the statute, and a
park operator has no right conferred onto him by this law to require a
key to gain entrance to the mobile homeowner's property.
The statutory right of access, as provided in both sections 5321.04 and
3733.10 of the Ohio Revised Code,' 8 can be arguably construed to alter
the common law "escape clause" for landlord liability for the condition
of the premises. In the absence of landlord control or possession of the
premises, the courts have concluded that there is no corresponding
responsibility to make repairs.'27 The actions of the General Assembly
have brought into question the common law immunity in tort for park
operators. '
C. Obligations of Tenants
Taken as a whole, the section of the law on the obligations of tenants
reflects sentiments similar to those of the framers of the apartment
landlord-tenant law. They tend to mirror in a like fashion many of the
obligations of park operators while complementing others. This in-
terlocking design can contribute to some transference of responsibility
but, more typically, park operators jealously protect all their duties so
as to limit tenant interference with the operation of the park. The
similarity in the statutory scheme of tenant obligations reflects the pro-
123 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(A)(6) (Page 1980).
124 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01 (Page 1980).
125 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101 (Page 1980).
126 Ouio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, 3733.10 (Page 1981).
127 See, e.g., Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393, 397 (1875). See also
Shindelbeck v. Moon, 32 Ohio St. 264, 275 (1877).
128 This issue was resolved regarding the apartment landlord-tenant act. The
Ohio Supreme Court, in Shroades v. Rental Homes, 68 Ohio St. 2d 20 (1981), held
that. a landlord is liable for injuries sustained on the residential premises caused
by the landlord's failure to meet his duties under Ohio Rev. Code § 5321.04. The
similarities between Ohio Rev. Code §§ 5321.04 and 3733.10 would lead one to
conclude that, park operators will also be liable for any tortious conduct. See
notes 185-90 infra and accompanying text.
(Vol. 30:57
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss1/9
MOBILE HOME TENANT-LANDLORD ACT
position that mobile homeowners and the apartment tenants have
similar interests. Primary among these interests is to define their
responsibilities in order to delimit those actions or inactions for which
the landlord may deprive them of use of the property.'29
The specific duties of tenants, when correlated with those of the
landlord, should not be interpreted to remove the primary responsibili-
ty from the landlord or park operator. For example, the tenant's respon-
sibility to "keep that part of the premises that he occupies and usesP"30
safe and sanitary"'3 ' should not be held equivalent to the park operator's
duty to "make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to
put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition."'32 Similarly,
the tenant's obligation to "dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other
waste in a clean, safe, and sanitary manner ' cannot be compared to
health council requirements regarding solid waste collection and
storage which describe park operator responsibility for the adequacy
and type of container and frequency of collection.,'
The obligation of tenants under this section to avoid damaging the
premises or tolerating any other person committing such acts 3 ' simply
codifies the common law principle of waste. The responsiblity of return-
ing the premises to the landlord in a state similar to that which existed
when the property was conveyed in order to avoid liability'36 is simply
raised to a statutory level. It differs from common law principles by ig-
noring any improvements (ameliorative waste)'37 and creating tenant
" "By defining both the landlord's and tenant's responsibilities, the proposed
statute protects both parties. It gives each party notice of his own as well as the
other party's duties under the statute." See Protection for Mobile Home Owners,
supra note 29, at 118.
" It has been argued that the use of the conjunctive "and" limits this duty to
those premises that are both occupied and used by the tenant, thus emphasizing
the exclusion of common areas from tenant responsibility. See Ohio Landlord and
Tenant Reform Act, supra note 31, at 899.
'' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(A)(1) (Page 1980).
312 Id. § 3733.10(A)(2).
-- Id. § 3733.101(A)(2).
I" OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-20 (1980).
"5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(A)(4) (Page 1980).
36 See Ohio Landlord and Tenant Reform Act, supra note 31, at 899. A tenant
is under continuing obligation to repair where his acts amount to voluntary waste
and involve a breach of the obligation to use the premises in a husband-like man-
ner. See Rammell v. Bulen, 51 Ohio Law Abs. 125, 126, 80 N.E.2d 167, 168 (Ohio
App. 1948).
"' Such a recognition could be used to guarantee a tenant's equity if an evic-
tion forces him to leave the park before he succeeds in selling the home, thereby
allowing the improvements to revert to the possession or benefit of the park
operator. This would be a more reasonable response than forcing the home to be
moved, which could cause damage or add exit fees to the homeowners existing
economic hardship.
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liability for those acts committed by "any other person who is on the
premises with his permission." 3 '
The provision of the statute which charges the mobile homeowner to
comply with "applicable state and local housing, health, and safety
codes, rules of the public health council and rules of the house trailer
park"' 39 appears formidable on its face. Upon careful review, however, it
can be interpreted as invoking a monitoring role for the tenant, " cer-
tainly not one of primary responsibility for compliance. The fact that
compliance requirements are imposed for only those codes and rules
that are applicable, of which none generally apply to areas over which
mobile home tenants have control, relieves tenants from such duties.
1 4 1
In like fashion, the health council rules mandate no specific responsibili-
ty for tenants. The logical deduction is that tenant obligations only re-
quire tenants to do nothing to interfere with the park operator's ability
to comply. Actual experience, however, may reveal that the more
typical role of tenants is pressing landlords for compliance, invoking the
assistance of health districts or seeking relief from the court system
when all else fails.
Rules of the mobile home park by their inclusion in the statute are
raised to equivalency of housing, health and safety codes and health
council rules. These rules cannot be ignored by a claim of their lacking
applicability. Their specific incorporation gives the park operator an
almost private legislative role to impose restrictions which may range
from who may visit the mobile homeowner and in what numbers, how to
dry clothes and whether children will be tolerated and to what extent. " 3
138 See Ohio Landlord and Tenant Reform Act, supra note 31, at 898. The right
to forfeit a lease for the commission of waste is recognized. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.
672 (1919).
'a OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(A)(3) (Page 1978).
40 This oversight role cannot be performed unless the landlord is restricted in
his ability to terminate the tenant's possession of the property. The rent escrow
mechanism reflects the legislature's recognition of the necessity for the tenant to
remain in possession of the premises if they are going to succeed in prodding the
landlord to meet his obligations. See Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio St. 2d 178, 407
N.E.2d 495 (1980).
.4. The fact that landlord duty to comply is limited to those items that
"materially affect health and safety" and no similar modifier exists under tenant
obligations is peculiar. Establishing tenant duties by statute is an equity-creating
mechanism, and the purpose would be defeated by extending tenant responsibility
to those rules and codes that landlords can ignore because they do not materially
affect health and safety. Establishing additional grounds for landlord action
either in claiming damages or terminating rental agreements would further con-
flict with the object of this reform statute. See Protection for Mobile
Homeowners, supra note 29, at 118.
12 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733 et seq. (Page 1980).
43 In one case reported to the Housing Advocates, Inc. Hotline, the park rules
set a limit to the combined ages of the children living in the mobile home park.
However, these rules are limited by both OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(C)
(Page 1980) (requiring them not to be "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious")
and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.16 (Page 1980) (Page 1980) ("unconscionability").
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The codification of common law under this section continues with the
incorporation in both the 1974 law and the mobile home statute of the
obligation to respect a neighbor's right to "peaceful enjoyment of the
premises.''14 Unlike apartment tenants, mobile homeowners do not
share walls, but their homes may be as close as five feet when placed
end to end . 4 5 Unlike other sections of the statute that attempt to define
responsibilities and rights of landlords vis-a-vis tenants, this provision
would appear to establish a bridge between tenants; the remedy is in
the hands of both fellow tenants and the park operator.'46 The design
provides an action in nuisance which requires the disturbance to be
significant to reach the threshold of liability and so defines the extent of
injury suffered by the plaintiff.'47
The right of a park operator to enter the privately owned mobile
home is limited to his request to inspect utility connections. 4 s This ac-
cess provision is consistent with his responsibilities under public health
council rules. Electrical systems,'49 the sewage connector'5 ° and water
service pipes'' are responsibilities assigned to the park operator under
that regulatory scheme.
The park operator's statutory right of access to the premises 2 is
phrased "enter onto the premises, ' in contrast to the apartment
landlord provision that requires his right to "enter into the dwelling
unit."'5 4 With the definition clearly speaking to "a lot located within a
house trailer park,"' 5 there is no question that the park operator is
clearly limited in his access to the tenant's mobile home. This statutory
provision and its implied limitation is less clearly defined under the
obligation of the park operator;5 ' there, the meaning of right of access
to "enter onto residential premises '"157 is in reality ignored and abused
... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(A)(5) (Page 1980).
"' If the park was constructed prior to July 1, 1971, the five foot distance is
acceptable under health council rules. OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-08(D) (1979).
146 A park operator may sue for breach of this "quiet enjoyment" provision by
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(C) (Page 1980), and/or fellow tenants have this
same right under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.14 (Page 1980).
' ' Conduct of a tenant or other persons on the premises with his consent must
result in an injury which is greater than "a trifling annoyance, inconvenience, or
discomfort." See Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 477, 78 N.E.2d 752,
759 (1947).
141 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(B) (Page 1980).
149 OHIo AD. CODE § 3701-27-24 (1979).
's' OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-19 (1979).
'5' OHIO AD. CODE § 3701-27-13 (1979).
's2 For definitions of premises as they are applied to the Ohio Landlord-Tenant
Law and the Landlord-Tenant Law for House Trailer Parks, see note 80 supra.
's' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(B) (Page 1980).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.05(B) (Page 1981).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01(L) (Page 1980).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.10(5), (6) (Page 1980).
157 Id.
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when the unsophisticated mobile homeowner is confronted by a demand
for blanket inspection of his home without realizing the strict limita-
tions on access imposed by the statute.
IV. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
A. Remedies of the Park Operator
The violation by a mobile homeowner of his obligations gives rise to
several legal options which may be taken by the park operator. These
remedies include recovering any actual damages15' resulting from the
violation, injunctive relief to gain access to the mobile home or
premises, termination of the rental agreement, maintaining an action in
forcible entry and detainer and, if successful in the litigation, receiving
reasonable attorney fees.
1 59
The statutory provision for damages simply codifies common law
principles that a party breaching a contract may be held liable for
damages proximately caused and suffered as a result of the breach.' °
The legislature placed a restriction on the type of damages that can be
awarded in this type of action to actual or compensatory damages,
rather than including punitive damages. This restriction places the
burden on the park operator to show that the injuries were both
forseeable from ' and proximately caused by 6' the breach of the con-
tract. It does not provide any further relief not already available to
landlords prior to the enactment of the new statute.
Injunctive relief is specifically limited to ordering a noncomplying te-
nant to permit the park operator's reasonable access to the mobile
home. '63 The utility of this remedy for a park operator is questionable.
5' This is based on both OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.101(C) and 3733.14
(Page 1980). An identical provision is found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.12
(Page 1981). The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted § 5321.12 as giving rise to a
statutory tort. See Shroades v. Rental Homes, 68 Ohio St. 2d 20, 25 (1981).
159 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(C) (Page 1980).
18 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.14 (Page 1980).
181 Depending on whether the analysis of the statute is based on contract or
tort, the theory of recovery can have a substantial impact on the award of
damages. If violation of the statute is thought of as a statutory tort then the
mobile homeowner could become liable for all damages proximately resulting
from the breach. On the other hand, judicial interpretation of the statute based
on contract principles imposes liability for only the injuries which were
reasonably forseeable at the time the illegal acts occurred. Thrash v. Hill, 63 Ohio
St. 2d 178, 407 N.E.2d 495 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Shroades v.
Rental Homes, 68 Ohio St. 2d 20 (1981), supports the latter analysis limiting the
types of injuries that can be awarded to a landlord to those for damages to prop-
erty or rents owned and due. See Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S.
540 (1903); Deutsch v. Hoge, 94 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 259
(6th Cir. 1950).
162 See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
16 See notes 148-58 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:57
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss1/9
MOBILE HOME TENANT-LANDLORD ACT
Assuming that the situation warrants litigation, one would doubt that a
landlord would stop at requesting injunctive relief rather than seeking
to regain possession of the property by filing a forcible entry and de-
tainer action.
In order to obtain injunctive relief under the statute, the park
operator would have to prove the following: (1) the probability of his
succeeding on the merits of the case; (2) that the mobile homeowner's
refusal to permit access to his unit or its residential premises is causing
irreparable injury to the park operator; and (3) the injunctive relief
sought is needed to preserve the status quo."4 The court, in considering
a request for an injunction, must balance the equities involved in this
matter."5 It should take into account the right of privacy of the mobile
homeowner in light of the limited access provided under the statute to
the park operator. Any doubts should be weighed in favor of refusing to
issue an injunction which would require a person to open his home to
another person.
The statute establishes three procedures by which a park operator
could terminate a rental agreement."' 6 The basis for determining which
procedure to follow depends on whether the decision to terminate is
based on either the mobile homeowner's noncompliance with any statu-
tory duty that materially affects health and safety or failure to pay
rent. 67 Assuming that the noncompliance materially affects health and
safety, the park operator must first deliver a written notice to the te-
nant describing the conduct which constitutes the noncompliance and in-
forming him that failure to correct the condition will cause termination
of the lease. 6' The statute mandates that the notice state a time when
" Great Southern Fire-Proof Hotel Co. v. McClain, 3 Ohio N.P. 247, 4 Ohio
Dec. Repr. 309 (1896).
165 Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio 1952); see
Hubman Supply Co. v. Irvin, 119 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1953).
166 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.13 (Page 1980).
167 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.13 (Page 1980), provides that:
If the tenant fails to fulfill any obligation imposed upon him by Sec-
tion 3733.101 [3733.10.11 of the Revised Code that materially affects
health and safety, the park operator may deliver a written notice of this
fact to the tenant specifying the act and omission that constitutes non-
compliance with such provisions and that the rental agreement will ter-
minate upon a date specified in the written notice not less than thirty
days after receipt of the notice. If the tenant fails to remedy the condi-
tion contained in the notice, the rental agreement shall then terminate
as provided in the notice.
Id.
166 The reference to "may" in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.13 (Page 1980), does
not give the park operator a choice not to provide written notice before ter-
minating an agreement. The "may" relates back to the park operator's option of
deciding to begin the statutory procedure necessary for termination of the lease.
If the park operator desires to terminate the agreement, he must follow the pro-
cedures set forth in the statute. Such a warning period also applies to oral leases.
See Holiday Plaza Inv. Corp. v. Clark, 306 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1975).
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failure to correct the acts or omissions will cause termination of the
agreement; this time limit must be at least thirty days from the date of
receipt of the notice.'l 9
Only when the mobile homeowner fails to correct the condition in a
timely fashion after proper notice can the agreement be terminated.
Termination of the agreement, however, does not give the park opera-
tor the right to use self-help methods to force the mobile homeowner
from the site.' A refusal of the mobile homeowner to leave makes him a
hold-over tenant, but the park operator must still institute a forcible en-
try and detainer action to regain possession of the premises or to
recover back rent.
1 71
The second set of procedures relates to the failure by the mobile
homeowner to meet his obligations to pay the rent in a timely fashion.'72
The statute provides that default in rent is the basis for terminating the
rental agreement in a summary fashion.'73 The written notice require-
ment is limited to the three day statutory requirement mandated before
an action for forcible entry and detainer can be filed by the park
operator."4 The statute, however, recognizes the right of a tenant to file
counterclaims based on the park operator's violation of either statutory
or contract rights.7 5
169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.13 (Page 1980).
"70 All forms of self help by park operators are prohibited by OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3733.17(A) (Page 1978), which states that:
No park operator of residential premises shall initiate any act, in-
cluding termination of utilities or services, exclusion from the premises,
or threat of any unlawful act, against a tenant, or a tenant whose right
to possession has terminated, for the purpose of recovering possession of
residential premises, other than as provided in Chapters 1923, 3733 and
5303 of the Revised Code.
See also Ohio Landlord and Tenant Reform Act, supra note 31, at 907-09.
"' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.17(B) (Page 1980). This section also prohibits
park operators from seizing the mobile homeowner's furnishings or possessions
for the purpose of recovering rent owed without an order issued by the ap-
propriate court. In New York the alternative choice to collect past due rent in
lieu of eviction is legal. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233 (McKinney). See Valley
Forge Village v. Bromberger, 86 Misc.2d 227, 382 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1976).
172 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.911(A)(1) (Page 1980). This section authorizes
the park operator to bring a forcible entry and detainer action whenever "the te-
nant is in default in the payment of rent." Id.
'13 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.02 (Page 1980).
'"' Id. § 1923.04.
115 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.091(B) (Page 1980), states: "The maintenance
of an action by the park operator under this section does not prevent the tenant
from recovering damages for any violation by the park operator of the rental
agreement or of section 3733.10 of the Revised Code." Id. It is possible to defeat
an action in forcible entry and detainer by using this method. Under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1923.061 (Page 1980), if the tenant's award of damages equal or are
greater than the rent owed, the action will be dismissed in the favor of the
mobile homeowner. This provision codifies Ohio common law which recognizes
[Vol. 30:57
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The third procedure relates to terminating the lease when the viola-
tion does not materially affect health or safety. It is open to question
whether the legislature intended that a park operator could have the
rental agreement terminated for a violation of the statute or rental
agreement which does not materially affect health or safety. There is no
provision of the law specifically relating to these circumstances. It
would, however, be anomalous to argue that the Ohio General Assembly
would give mobile homeowners who are seriously violating the law
rights superior to those persons in technical or minor breaches of it.
Such an interpretation would not implement the legislature's mandate
to liberally construe this statute."' Furthermore, courts have refused to
evict persons for trivial breaches in similar circumstances.177
A recent decision by the Lucas County Court of Appeals interpreted
Ohio's forcible entry and detainer statute as prohibiting park operators
from evicting mobile homeowners without good cause. In Ward v.
Allen,7 ' the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Sixth District interpreted sec-
the right of a tenant to raise defenses of "set-off' in forcible entry and detainer
actions. Kuhn v. Griffin, 3 Ohio App. 2d 195 (Ohio App. 1964). In mobile home
cases in other states any defense available under law may be raised against the
proceedings. See Bowles v. Blue Lake Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir.
1974); McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535 (Alaska 1976).
176 See notes 26 and 27 supra and accompanying text. See also Wishnek v.
Gulla, 114 N.E.2d 914 (Cuy. Cty. C.P. 1953).
"' McNeece v. Wood, 204 Cal. 280, 285, 267 P. 877, 880 (1928). An unreported
case under Chapter 5321, Fitzpatrick Realty v. Wilkey, No. 78 CVG 8102, Slip Op.
(Dayton Mun. Ct. 1979), states:
We are thrown, then, back to consideration of the case under general
contract principles. In order for a breach by a promisor to work a
discharge of the promisee (and thus entitle a landlord/promisee to evic-
tion), the breach must be material. I specifically find Defendant's alleged
breach here is not material enough to work a discharge.
Id at 2. Ohio Courts have a powerful tool under the new statute to balance the
equities to avoid an unjust result. Under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.16, the
Court may refuse to enforce or apply a clause or the whole rental agreement if as
a matter of law it finds that to do so would be unconscionable. This is especially
useful in light of the economic hardship that would occur to a mobile homeowner
forced to relocate his unit. See notes 218-23 infra and accompanying text.
17' Ward v. Allen, No. L-80-388 (6th App. Dist 1981). The court, in requiring
good cause for eviction, stated:
Upon our review of the record we find however that the trial court did
err in granting plaintiff-appellee judgment for possession. This land-
lord's complaint was brought pursuant to the provisions of Ch. 1923 of
the Revised Code. The provisions of R.C. 1923-02, effective when this ac-
tion was filed and heard, provided in part as follows:
"(A) Proceedings under Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code may be
had:
(10) Against house trailer tenants who have defaulted in the pay-
ment of rent or breached the terms of a rental agreement with a
house trailer park operator."
Our examination of the record indicates that plaintiff-appellee, in filing
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tion 1923.02(A)(10) as requiring that a park operator must allege in any
complaint requesting restitution of the premises that the mobile
homeowner had either defaulted in the payment of rent or breached the
terms of the rental agreement, to state a claim under Chapter 1923. If
other courts adopt this sagacious analysis of Chapter 1923 then Ohio
will have one of the strongest provisions in the nation protecting mobile
homeowners from arbitrary eviction attempts.
Recovery of the premises is the most devastating remedy available to
the park operator and most clearly reflects the imbalance of power that
exists in this area of law. In many states the legislatures have specifical-
ly enumerated the basis for requesting an eviction. 9 The Florida
statute contains provisions similar to most states that have adopted this
method. It provides that a mobile homeowner may not be evicted except
for the following reasons: (a) Nonpayment of rent; (b) Conviction of a
violation of some federal or state law or local ordinance which may be
deemed detrimental to the health, safety or welfare of other dwellers in
the mobile home park; (c) Violation of any reasonable rule or regulation
established by the park owner or operator, provided the mobile
homeowner received written notice of the grounds upon which he is to
be evicted at least thirty days prior to the date he is required to vacate;
or (d) Change in the use of land comprising the mobile home park pro-
vided all tenants are given at least ninety days notice or longer if pro-
vided for in a valid lease, of the projected change of use and of their
need to secure other accommodations. 180
Ohio has not enacted a similar provision containing an unambiguous
set of conditions warranting an eviction action. The present system has
resulted in inconsistent rulings requiring unnecessary litigation.'81
this action did not allege that defendant-appellant had defaulted in the
payment of rent or had breached the terms of the rental agreement. In-
stead plaintiff-appellee alleged that defendant-appellant was holding
over after receiving notice to vacate the trailer lot. Therefore, we find
that the provisions of Ch. 1923 are inapplicable in the case sub judice.
The trial court erred in issuing an order for possession.
Id.
179 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.75 (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 32J
(West Supp. 1975); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.44 (West Supp. 1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205-A:3 (Supp. 1979). Such enumeration does not impair pro-
perty rights or contract rights and makes the lease and other prior laws subser-
vient to the eviction provisions. See Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong,
300 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1974).
"1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.759 (West 1981).
.., The present system permits the filing of an eviction on any ground except
in retaliation for certain protective conduct under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3733.09 (Page 1980). However, as previously discussed, the statute sets forth
several additional defenses like set-offs and unconscionability which can defeat an
eviction action. Further, Ohio courts have consistently recognized the right of a
judge to permit all equitable defenses in these matters. See Lauch v. Monning, 15
Ohio App. 2d 112, 239 N.E.2d 675 (1968); Kuhn v. Griffin, 3 Ohio App. 2d 195, 209
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Under the statute, attorney fees can be awarded to park operators only
in actions filed requesting monetary awards or bad faith rent deposits."' 2
The purpose of limiting the recovery of fees to these types of actions
arguably reflects the concern of the legislature to prevent attorney fees
from being used as a threat of sanction against mobile homeowners at-
tempting to exercise their rights. This may also be the reason that the
Ohio legislature prohibited the rental agreement from containing any
provision for awarding attorney fees for either a park operator or
mobile homeowner.'83
B. Tenant Remedies
The remedies created under the mobile home statute parallel to a
great extent those discussed under the landlord remedies section.'84
There are, however, several unique remedies established under the law
including rent deposit, court-ordered repair, rent reduction and uncon-
scionability. The tenant remedy sections can be divided into self-help
and court-ordered relief.
As many of the mobile home provisions mirror those found in the
apartment landlord-tenant law, a brief review of the precedent-setting
case of Shroades v. Rental Homes'85 is important for this discussion. In
N.E.2d 824 (1964); Blenheim Homes v. Mathews, 119 Ohio App. 44, 196 N.E.2d 612
(1963); Barr Hotel Co. v. Lloyd MacKeown Buick Co., 104 Ohio App. 69, 146
N.E.2d 879 (1957). This creates unnecessary confusion which could be avoided by
enumerating the specific circumstances warranting the eviction of a mobile
homeowner. See also OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.02 (Page Supp. 1980), for a
general list enumerating when a forcible entry and detainer action may be filed.
This may well be accomplished by the holding of Ward v. Allen, No. L-80-388 (6th
App. Dist 1981). See note 178 supra.
182 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101 (Page 1980) discusses attorney fees only in
actions to "recover actual damages." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.101(C) (Page
1980). This seems to exclude the second sentence of subsection (C) which refers to
actions to terminate the rental agreement, to obtain injunctive relief or recover
the premises. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.122(D) provides in reference to rent
deposits:
If the court finds that the condition contained in the notice given pur-
suant to division (A) of section 3733.12 of the Revised Code was the
result of an act or omission of the tenant, or that the tenant intentionally
acted in bad faith in proceeding under section 3733.12 of the Revised
Code, the tenant shall be liable for damages caused to the park operator,
and for costs, together with the reasonable attorneys' fees if the tenant
intentionally acted in bad faith.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.122(D) (Page 1980).
183 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.15(C) (Page 1980). Considering the relatively
unequal bargaining positions between the two parties, it would seem doubtful
that a rental agreement would ever contain a provision recognizing the awarding
of attorneys' fees to a mobile homeowner. This provision is aimed at eliminating
this additional threat of economic injury.
184 See notes 158-83 supra and accompanying text.
"' 68 Ohio St.2d 20 (1981).
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Shroades a tenant was injured and hospitalized from a fall through a
broken step on the outside stairway that led to her second floor apart-
ment. The stairway was considered under the tenant's control and not a
common area. Both the tenant and the fire chief had previously notified
the landlord that this stairway needed repair. At trial the jury found for
the tenant and the judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, ap-
parently before the litigants became aware of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Thrash v. Hill.8 ' While the court in Thrash rejected the claim
that the Ohio Landlord-Tenant law created "duties or standards of con-
duct for the breach of which a tenant may hold his landlord liable in
tort,"'87 the Shroades court found "that a violation of this statute is
negligence per se."' 8 The court characterized the statutory remedies
provided in Chapter 5321 as "intended to be preventive and supplement-
al to other remedial measures."'89 The retention of common law
remedies possessed by both landlord and tenant was reaffirmed by the
concurring opinion by Justice Clifford F. Brown. 9 ° The impact of
Shroades should promote the same result in the decisions under the new
mobile home law. In fact, because of the marked difference between the
remedy provisions of these two statutes, 9' the holding of Shroades is
even stronger with regard to the mobile home landlord-tenant law.
Under section 5321.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code"2 the remedy is
limited to damages caused by the landlord making illegal or unreason-
able entry into the tenant's premises. This is also covered in section
186 63 Ohio St.2d 178, 407 N.E.2d. 495 (1981).
187 Id. at 183, 407 N.E.2d at 499 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
'" 68 Ohio St.2d at 26.
189 Id. at 25.
'9o Id. at 27. See Stronger v. Lindeman, 68 Ohio St.2d 32 (1981), decided the
same day as Shroades, which affirmed the liability of a landlord for negligence in
the actual performance of repairs.
'9' Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B):
If the landlord makes an entry in violation of division (A)(8) of this
section, or makes a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes
repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful which have the effect of
harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages resulting
therefrom and obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the
conduct, and if he obtains a judgment reasonable attorneys' fees, or ter-
minate the rental agreement.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Page 1980) (emphasis added). Regarding OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(B):
If the park operator violates any provision of this section, makes a
lawful entry onto the residential premises in an unreasonable manner, or
makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful which demands
have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover actual
damages resulting from the violation, entry or demands and injunctive
relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and if he obtains a judg-
ment, reasonable attorneys' fees, or terminate the rental agreement.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.19(B) (Page 1980) (emphasis added).
'9' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(B) (Page 1980).
'9' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(B) (Page 1980).
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3733.10(B) of the Ohio Revised Code19 but the Ohio General Assembly
went beyond chapter 5321 to include coverage of any violation of section3733 .10.114
Pre-mobile home law decision by Ohio courts have not been favorable
to tenants attempting to establish tort liability against part operators.195
In light of section 3733.10(B), however, and buttressed by the decision in
Shroades, such an action in tort may now lie against a park operator
because of his failure to meet the statutory standards of habitability
and maintenance of common areas."'
While self-help devices are prohibited in this statute for park
operators, the Ohio General Assembly has encouraged mobile home-
owners to use this device to enforce the statute. Under the law, a
homeowner who reasonably believes that a park operator has failed to
fulfill any obligations imposed by either Ohio Revised Code section
3733.10198 or the rental agreement may, by following certain procedures,
deposit rent with the Clerk of Courts of the appropriate municipal
court.'99 In order to rent deposit, the mobile homeowner must have pro-
vided written notice specifying the omissions that violate his contrac-
tual or statutory rights. 09 After this notice, the law requires him to wait
a reasonable time or thirty days, whichever is sooner, before depositing
his rent.2"' What is "reasonable" is not defined by the Act, but the time
period should be determined in light of the severity of the problems
complained of and the time necessary to correct these conditions. A
final precondition before depositing rent is that the mobile homeowner
must be current in all rent due under the rental agreement; °2 also, when
depositing his rent with the court, it must be done in a timely fashion."3
Failure to meet one or more of these preconditions will result in the
park operator obtaining the release of the rent deposited with the
court.0 4 Any action to obtain the release of these monies must include
the mobile homeowner as a party and, as in any civil action, the mobile
home tenant has the right to file an answer and counterclaim. The
statute mandates that a trial must be held within sixty days of the filing
", See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321 (Page 1981) and § 3733.10 (Page
1980).
"' Hersch v. Anderson Acres, Inc., 5 Ohio Ops. 2d 432, 146 N.E.2d 648 (1957);
See Straley v. Keltner, 109 Ohio App. 51, 164 N.E.2d 186 (1959).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.10(B) (Page 1980).
197 See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
1 Id. § 3733.10.
' Id. § 3733.12(B)(1).
211 Id. § 3733.12(A). However, this requirement is presumed to be waived by
the park operator for failure to provide written notice of the owner's and
manager's name and address.
20' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(B) (Page 1980).
202 Id.
203 Id.
20 Id § 3733.122(C).
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of the park operator's complaint. However, the court may grant a con-
tinuance for good cause shown by either party."'5
A potential defect in the effectiveness of rent deposit is that the court
may release a portion of the rent for payment of certain costs of
operating the mobile home park.' The statute provides guidance to the
court in determining whether monies should be released to the landlord
before the trial. ' An arbitrary policy of releasing this rent would be
contrary to the legislative intent of the depositing scheme. ' These
funds should be released only if the landlord can show an economic hard-
ship which threatens his property interests. Should the court find that
the rent deposit was made in bad faith or that the conditions complained
of were caused by the mobile homeowner, damages and attorney fees
may be awarded to the park operator.0 9
There is no indication that a park operator should be permitted to
evict a mobile homeowner for a mistake in either procedure or judg-
ment in exercising his rights to rent deposit. This is tacitly recognized
in the statute by its requiring only the mobile homeowner's reasonable
belief that the park operator is violating his statutory or contractual
obligations. '
"5 Id § 3733.122(B). The statute does not indicate the criteria to be used in
deciding if there is "good cause" to grant a continuance. However, another sum-
mary proceeding, forcible entry and detainer, does give guidance to a court on
this issue. Under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.081 (Page Supp. 1980), good cause
includes a request to file an answer, counterclaim or conduct discovery.
"6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.123(A) states:
If a park operator brings an action for the release of rent deposited
with a clerk of court, the court may, during the pendency of the action,
upon the application of the park operator, release part of the rent on
deposit for payment of the periodic interest on a mortgage on the
premises, the periodic principle payments on a mortgage on the
premises, the insurance premiums for the premises, real estate taxes on
the premises, utility services, repairs, and other customary and usual
costs of operating the premises.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.123(A) (Page 1980).
2" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.123(B) provides:
In determining whether to release rent for the payments described in
division (A) of this section, the court shall consider the amount of rent
the park operator receives from other lots, the cost of operating these
lots, and the costs which may be required to remedy the condition con-
tained in the notice given pursuant to division (A) of section 3733.12 of
the Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.123(B) (Page 1980).
See notes 198-207 supra and accompanying text.
There is a distinction drawn between the sanctions a court must impose
dependant upon a judicial finding of bad faith. Under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3733.12(D) (Page 1980), if conditions complained of were caused by the tenant, the
court must award damages caused to the park operator. A finding of bad faith,
however, requires the court not only to award damages, but also attorney fees
and costs to the part operator.
210 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(A) (Page 1980). Unless this is the case,
there is little likelihood that many persons would risk using this remedy to gain
park operator compliance with his obligations.
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The mobile homeowner has several other remedial options available
which intertwine with the self-help right to deposit rent with the
municipal court. Of the remaining remedies, most are not self-help in
nature, but require action by the courts; of the four remaining statutory
options available to mobile homeowners, three do not require the
depositing of rent as a precondition to exercising them."'
When a mobile home tenant has exercised his right to rent deposit
without obtaining the park operator's compliance, he may petition the
court to release the funds so that repairs can be undertaken and paid
for by these monies. 12 This, of course, requires as a precondition that
the tenant has deposited his rent with the court. This statutory remedy
is a hybrid of the common law "rent and deduct" concept. 13 The hybrid
nature of this remedy abrogates its "self-help" nature by requiring the
tenant to obtain a court order to exercise his right.21
A related remedy available to the mobile homeowner is to petition
the court for an injunction ordering the park operator to meet his
obligations under the statute or rental agreement."'2 In order to obtain
" Under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(B)(2) (Page 1980), the tenant may re-
quest a court to issue an injunction to require the park operator to comply with
his obligations and/or request a reduction in the amount of rent owed until the
conditions complained of have been corrected. While these are mutually ex-
clusive from the rent deposit scheme, the statutory notice and preconditions
found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(A) and (B) (Page 1980), still must be met
prior to taking such action. This is not the case with the remedy of "unconsciona-
bility" provided under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.16 (Page 1980). The tenant
may challenge any park rules, rent agreements, or their specific application
under this section without meeting the criteria under rent depositing scheme.
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(B)(2) (Page 1980) in pertinent part provides
that "the tenant ... may apply for an order to use the rent deposited to remedy
the condition ...... Id
213 An example of such rent and deduct decisions is Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), which held that:
If, therefore, a landlord fails to make repairs and replacements of
vital facilities necessary to maintain the premises in a livable condition
for a period of time adequate to accomplish such repair and replace-
ments, the tenant may cause the same to be done and deduct the cost
thereof from future rents.
Id. at 148, 265 A.2d at 535.
214 Delaware has adopted this common law doctrine specifically for mobile
homeowners. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2007(e) (1975).
An informal rent and deduct remedy is recognized in the forcible entry and de-
tainer statute. A tenant could make repairs, deducting the amount of the same
from his future lot rent. If an eviction action is filed under OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1923.061 (Page Supp. 1980), a tenant may file counterclaims to the action. When
the court awards damages to the tenant equalling or greater in amount to the
rent owed, the action is to be dismissed. The problem is that failure to anticipate
the court's judgment on reasonableness or the deductions results in the eviction
of the tenant. For this reason, such self-help repair and deductions should not be
encouraged.
2 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(B)(2) (Page 1980). Most states permit a
private attorney general type of action to enforce their mobile home statutes.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46.82.2 to 46.82.7 (Supp. 1978-79). See also Comment,
1981]
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this order, the mobile homeowner must meet the usual criteria required
before issuing any equitable remedy.21
Lot rent reduction is a further remedy for enforcing the rights of
mobile homeowners. Under the law the tenant can request the court to
reduce the amount of rent owed until the conditions complained of are
corrected. 17 The statute provides no guidance to the court in selecting
the method to determine the size of rent abatement or reduction, but
because a rental agreement is a contract, the Uniform Commercial Code
provisions offer a widely accepted method for this computation.2 18 A
court using this method would examine the fair market value of the ren-
tal agreement with and without the breach by the park operator to
determine the size of the reduction. 19 Ohio courts have accepted this
doctrine in similar circumstances.
220
The final statutory remedy is the use of the "unconscionability con-
cept" to attack arbitrary park rules, rental agreements or their specific
applications to a mobile homeowner. 21 This concept can be used either
as part of a defensive or offensive litigation strategy.2 22 This statutory
remedy is simply a recognition of an Anglo-Saxon tradition established
more than two hundred years ago. 22' The legislature provided this
remedy to mobile homowners after recognizing that unequal bargaining
Housing Code Enforcement by Private Attorneys GeneraL A Better Way?, 1973
URB. L. ANN. 299.
218 See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
217 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.12(B)(2) (Page 1980).
21R Under U.C.C. § 2-714(2), damages in a breach of warranty are measured by
the difference between the value of the goods received and the value of the goods
warranted.
218 The fair market value of the agreement need not be the same as the agreed
upon lot rent. The court should use the bargained for rent as evidence of fair
market value, but this should not be conclusive under this method. See Noble v.
Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 778 (1949).
220 Cochran v. Widra, 35 Ohio Law Abs. 608, 41 N.E.2d 875 (1931).
221 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.16 (Page 1980). Other states have similar laws
mandating the unenforceability of unconscionable rules. See Miller v. Valley
Forge Village, 43 N.Y.2d 626, 374 N.E.2d 118, 403 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1978); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-1411; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.754 (West 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §
562B.8 (West 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.555 (Baldwin 1979); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70-24-404; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-12; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233
(McKinney 1980).
For example, a tenant could file an action under section 16 arguing that a
park rule is unconscionable on its face or as it is applied to him. This would be
part of an offensive litigation strategy. On the other hand, a tenant could use this
concept to defend himself against an eviction action based on violation of a rule
which should not be enforced because of its unconscionability.
I One of the earliest recognitions in the United States of this concept described
unconscionability as "a contract such as no man in his senses and not under delu-
sion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on
the other." Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889), quoting Earl of
Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750).
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positions exist which tend to create rules and agreements decidedly op-
pressive or one-sided . 21 Using this tool, a court may redistribute and
equitably balance the parties' relationship.
The omission by the Ohio General Assembly of one of the remedies
available to apartment renters emphasizes the unique needs of mobile
homeowners. Under the 1974 Landlord-Tenant Act, the legislature
recognized that a remedy for a landlord's breach is the termination of
the rental agreement.22 5 There is no comparable provision in the mobile
home statute. This conspicuous absence emphasizes that the Ohio
General Assembly understood the economic impact involved in
relocating a mobile home. Offering such relief to a wronged tenant
would be ignoring the realities of mobile home living, and Ohio courts
should consider this unique situation when they are called upon to en-
force these new statutory tenant remedies.
The issue of retaliation closely follows the discussion of the landlord's
remedy of eviction because retaliatory conduct is often alleged as the
true reason for the action. Mobile homeowners are always subject to the
possibility of park retaliation, and thus many tenants are reluctant to
exercise their rights for fear of harassment or termination of the rental
agreement. A growing number of states have taken legislative action to
protect individuals from retaliatory eviction. New Jersey, in enacting,
what is probably the strongest law on the subject, includes protection
for complaints to officials, tenant organization activities and even
refusals to pay rents increased illegally.2
Ohio also has a retaliatory conduct provision in its mobile home law. 27
It prohibits the park operator from retaliating against a mobile
homeowner by increasing the rent, bringing or threatening to bring an
eviction action, or decreasing services to the tenant.28 The mobile
homeowner must show that the park operator's conduct was motivated,
at least in part, 9 by one of the following actions: (1) The tenant has com-
plained to an appropriate governmental agency of a violation of a
building, housing, health, or safety code that is applicable to the
premises, and the violation materially affects health and safety; (2) The
" See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Campbell
Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948). See generally Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
'2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.07(B)(3) (Page 1981).
2 N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 2A, 42-10(1) (West Supp. 1980). To a lesser degree,
Delaware, Florida, Michigan and Minnesota have provisions to prevent
retaliatory evictions.
SOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.09 (Page 1980).
Id § 3733.09(A).
It is axiomatic that, if a wrongful purpose such as retaliation is merely one
of many of what are otherwise legitimate reasons, retaliation "cannot be brushed
aside because it was neither the sole reason ... nor the totalfactor." Smith v. Sol
D. Adler Realty Corp., 436 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original). In-
deed, there is "no acceptable place in the law for 'partial' [retaliation]." Id. at 350.
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tenant has complained to the park operator of any violation of section
3733.10 of the Revised Code; or (3) The tenant joined with other tenants
for the purpose of negotiating or dealing collectively with the park
operator on any of the terms and conditions of a rental agreement.
2 3
The statute does not include a rebuttable presumption requiring the
landlord to prove, under certain circumstances, the absence of retalia-
tory intent. 31 While this may limit the effectiveness of the statutory
protections, tenants need only prove their claim by a preponderance of
the evidence. Evidence to support such a claim could include: (a) Time
period between protected action and retaliatory conduct;3 2 (b) Arbitrary
or inconsistent application of rules against one individual engaging in a
protected conduct but not against others who do not engage in such con-
duct;233 or (c) Lack of justification for an eviction. 21
The courts should be sensitive to the impact of retaliatory conduct on
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.09(A)(1)-(3) (Page 1980).
231 However, the court has the inherent power to establish such a presump-
tion. This was the case in Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 865
(D.C. Cir. 1972) which held that:
It is commonplace, however, that a jury can judge a landlord's state
of mind . . . by examining its objective manifestations. Thus, when a
landlord's conduct is "inherently destructive" of tenants' rights, or
unavoidably chills their exercise, the jury may, under well recognized
principles, presume that the landlord intended this result.... Once the
presumption is established, it is then up to the landlord to rebut it by
demonstrating that he is motivated by some legitimate business pur-
pose....
Id. (emphasis added).
232 In housing litigation, courts have looked beyond the landlord's obstensible
motive and have held that the law bars sophisticated as well as simple-minded
retaliation. See United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.
1973). In Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1972), for example, the court
prohibited a park operator's retaliation against the exercise by a tenant of speak-
ing out regarding conditions and organizing a tenants union. Likewise, a
landlord's retaliatory conduct by way of eviction was barred where the tenant
merely complained about conditions. See Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp.,
463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Ohio Landlord-Tenant Reform Act, supra
note 31, at 929-43.
1 In another type of housing case, the United States Supreme Court has in-
structed:
Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might affirm
evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. Substantive depar-
tures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered
important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to
the one reached.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (emphasis added).
23 Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 2d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970); S.P. Growers Assoc. v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1976).
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all park tenants as well as the affected individual tenant.2 5 A liberal ap-
proach to the submission of evidence is the best protection against park
operators attempting to circumvent the legislative reform represented
in the mobile home statute. A finding by a court of retaliatory conduct
by a park operator is grounds for awarding actual damages suffered by
the tenant together with reasonable attorney fees. 38 Actual damages
have been interpreted broadly in Ohio to include humiliation, mental
distress and loss of time or property.
237
Ohio's retaliatory provision has been upheld in the courts.238 Florida's
235 The ramifications of retaliatory conduct are broader than effectively forc-
ing out one responsible tenant: It chills the very exercise of rights granted by the
Act. In the best known landlord-tenant retaliation case, Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968), Judge Skelly Wright ex-
plained that the "effectiveness of remedial [landlord-tenant] legislation will be in-
hibited if those reporting violations of it can legally be intimidated." Id. In Port-
noy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1968), the court held the under-
standing that no action in possession would be taken by the landlord if a tenant
would stop exercising his rights to be retaliatory. A landlord, up until the enact-
ment of the Ohio Act, could legally employ the most blatant and reprehensible
of tactics if a tenant were to complain about conditions. Retaliation, by threat of
eviction, as here or by other means, was one of the "most frightening problem[s]."
Note, The Use of the Federal Remedy to Bar Retaliatory Eviction, 30 U. CIN. L.
REV. 712, 712 (1970).
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.09(B) (Page 1980) provides:
If a park operator acts in violation of division (A) of this section, the
tenant may:
(1) Use the retaliatory action of the park operator as a defense to an
action by the park operator to recover possession of the premises;
(2) Recover possession of the premises;
(3) Terminate the rental agreement.
In addition, the tenant may recover from the park operator any actual
damages together with reasonable attorneys fees.
IL
2 Damages which are awarded for humiliation, mental distress, and lost time,
are not punitive but actual under Ohio law. In Smith v. Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne
and Chicago Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10 (1872), the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
It is true, the law does not profess to compensate for remote and
possible injuries resulting from the act of a wrongdoer, but it does pro-
fess to make the injured party whole, by compensating him, in damages,
for all the natural, necessary, and probable injuries resulting therefrom.
... This process of reasoning brings us to the inevitable conclusion, that
injuries to the person, whether they consist of mental or physical pain,
as well as loss of time or property, which naturally and necessarily
result from the wrongful and deliberate act of the defendant, are proper
subjects for the consideration of the jury in their estimate of compen-
satory damages.
Id. at 18-19. See also Brownlee v. Pratt, 77 Ohio App. 533, 68 N.E.2d 798 (1946);
Rose Co. v. Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N.E. 716 (1929). This also applies
equally to awards of actual damages under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3733.10,
3733.101, 3733.14 (Page 1980).
' A similar provision in the apartment landlord-tenant law has been reviewed
and upheld by the Ohio courts. Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 370
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eviction protections, which are more stringent than Ohio's, have also
been judicially tested and found to be constitutional.2"9
An important remedy and method of protecting the equity of the
mobile homeowner is to permit the selling of their unit in place within
the mobile home park. Ohio has followed the lead of other states in
adopting this type of protection against interference from park opera-
tors.24 The noninterference requirement is created by the framework of
four different sections of the new law24" ' and, considered together, they
act to limit the economic penalties that park operators can impose to
prevent a return on the capital investment of the tenant.
N.E.2d 767 (1977); Belvoir Cliff Apartments, Ltd. v. Bembry, 56 Ohio Misc. 37, 383
N.E.2d 1170 (1978).
239 In Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1974), a te-
nant was allowed to remain in a park despite the termination by the park of his
oral month-to-month tenancy. The same year, several eviction cases consolidated
as Stewart v. Green, 300 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1974), a case in which the court declared
that due to the unique landlord-tenant relationship of mobile home parks and
homeowners, the tenancies required special treatment. The unequal power of a
park owner over a homeowner tenant therefore requires careful consideration in
eviction actions.
240 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4066 (1978).
241 All four sections of this "noninterference" concept are found in OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3733.11 (Page 1980), which states:
(A) The park operator shall offer the tenant the opportunity to sign a
rental agreement for a minimum of one year for residential premises
prior to the installation of the house trailer in the house trailer park, the
terms of which shall be essentially the same as for any alternate month-
to-month tenancy.
(F) No park operator shall require a tenant to purchase or lease a
house trailer from any specific dealer as a condition of or prerequisite
for entering into a rental agreement.
(H) No park operator shall:
(1) Deny any tenant the right to sell his house trailer within the
house trailer park if the tenant gives the park operator ten days
notice of his intention to sell his house trailer;
(2) Require the tenant to remove the house trailer from the
house trailer park solely on the basis of the sale of the house
trailer;
(3) Unreasonably refuse to enter into a rental agreement with a
purchaser of a house trailer located within his house trailer
park.
(K) No park operator shall enter into a rental agreement with the
owner of a trailer for the use of residential premises, if the rental agree-
ment requires the owner of the trailer, as a condition to his renting, oc-
cupying or remaining on the residential premises to pay the park opera-
tor or another person specified in the rental agreement a fee or any sum
of money based on the sale of the trailer, unless the owner of the trailer
uses the park operator or other person as his agent in the sale of the
trailer.
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The mobile homeowner's right to noninterference is triggered by a te-
nant notifying the park operator of his intention to sell the mobile
home.2 4 1 If the tenant gives this notice, the park operator can neither re-
quire the mobile home to be moved solely because of its sale243 nor
unreasonably refuse to enter into a rental agreement with the pur-
chaser of the unit." Also, the park operator cannot require the tenant
to give a commission on the sale of the home unless he acted as the
agent245
Three cases have reviewed the issue of sales interference by park
operators. These cases support the need for legal action in order to in-
sure that this important piece of reform legislation provides the protec-
tion which the legislature intended. In Mentor Trailer Park, Inc. v.
Clark,"' the court, while evicting Mrs. Clark for other reasons, stated
that: "This Court agrees with defendant that Ohio Revised Code Sec-
tions 3733.09 to 3733.20 are remedial and that Plaintiff's professed
policy of requiring a second owner to move a bought trailer [mobile
home] without regard to age and condition of such is improper." '47
In the recent case of Jameson v. Sommers Mobile Home Sales, Inc.,249
a park operator required tenants to sell their homes through his dealer-
ship or, alternatively, remove the home within thirty days of purchase.
The court decided that such action was illegal under the new statute,
declaring: "[Tbo hold otherwise would forever forestall the reforms in-
tended by R.C. Section 3733.01 et seq. Such policy is clearly a violation
of both the letter and the spirit of R.C. Section 3733.11(F) and (K)." '249
The final sales interference case, Trailer Mart v. Semenach,50 involved
the owner of a mobile home purchased from a previous owner, who faced
eviction proceedings because children were allegedly not allowed in his
section of the park.2  Evidence revealed that other children did in fact
live in the section in question, and the jury found that the action to evict
was really based on the fact that the previous owner had sold the home
and not paid the park owner a commission. A similar effort to ac-
212 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(H)(1) (page 1980). The notice must be given
at least 10 days prior to selling the mobile home.
243 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(H)(2) (Page 1980).
24 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(H)(3) (Page 1980) Also, under OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3733.11(H) (Page 1980), this offer must be of a one year lease.
214 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.11(K) (Page 1980). Such a ban on all commis-
sions or entrance fees, whether paid by the homeowner or the broker, was upheld
in People v. Mel Mack Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 621, 126 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1975).
244 Mentor Trailer Park v. Clark, No. CVG, 492 (Mentor Mun. Ct., June 7,
1979).
247 Id.
248 Jameson v. Sommer's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., No. 83769 (Elyria Mun. Ct.,
May 13, 1980).
249 Id.
250 Trailer Mart v. Semanach, No. 20397 (Berea Muni. Ct., June 11, 1980).
251 Id.
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complish by park rule what the law forbids arose in Maryland; a park
rule required that "all homes to be placed or retained after resale in the
Park must ... [be either a] new home or current year model ... ,,2"2 The
court found that such a park rule violated the purpose of the Act which
was to protect mobile home owners by preventing certain abusive prac-
tices and to insure their ability to sell their mobile homes.2 1
V. CONCLUSION
The law has made great strides toward establishing a balancing of in-
terests and responsibilities between mobile homeowners and park
operators. This area of the law will continue to undergo rapid changes in
the next few years as courts struggle to balance the complex relation-
ships between park operators and mobile homeowners."' The Mobile
Home Landlord-Tenant law can be a genuine instrument for reform only
if its provisions are liberally interpreted to give full meaning to the
Ohio General Assembly's intent in enacting this law.
While the Ohio Landlord-Tenant law preceded the Mobile Home Land-
lord-Tenant Act, the unique qualities of the latter dictate that its rights
and remedies must be considered independently from its "big brother"
252 Cider Barrel Mobile Home Court v. Eader, 414 A.2d 1246 (Md. App. 1980).
253 Id.
2' A recent federal appellate decision supports this proposition. In Ware v.
Trailer Mart, Inc., 623 F.2d 1150 (1980), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
found that a person attempting to rent a lot space in a mobile home park, who
was denied rental because of his refusal to buy a home from the park operator,
stated a valid claim under the federal antitrust laws. Judge Martin, writing the
opinion stated that:
Trailer Mart attempts to distinguish Reiter by noting that Mrs.
Reiter actually purchased the hearing aid at an illegally inflated price.
Here, insists defendant, Captain Ware never intended to enter into the
tying arrangement since he did not want to purchase mobile home. We
believe that this argument begs the question. Captain Ware has alleged
a wrongful deprivation of money by having to pay double rent for the
apartment and mobile home rental space. He incurred this loss because
of Trailer Mart's anticompetitive conduct in tying homesite leases to
trailer purchases. We therefore find that Ware has properly claimed an
injury under Section 4 and may, accordingly, sue to recover damages for
the alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1153.
The questions raised by specific practices not covered by the law include the
prohibition in many parks of "for sale" signs as a means of selling the home.
Results from litigation in other states have been mixed. Florida has allowed "for
sale" signs, but parks may apply reasonable restrictions to their size, placement,
etc. See FLA. STAT ANN. § 83.765 (West 1980); Blair v. Mobile Home Com-
munities, Inc., 345 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1977). New York, to the contrary, has upheld
the ban on such signs in parks. See also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233 (McKinney
1980); Miller v. Valley Forge Village, 43 N.Y.2d 626, 347 N.E.2d 118, 403 N.Y.S.2d
207 (1978).
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statute. The extensive case law built up around tenant rights with the
associated movement toward social reform, however, should not be ig-
nored, but blended with the newer law.
The new law, while improving the quality of the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, is still at this point merely a paper law. It remains largely
untested and often ignored by park operators. Without the forceful ad-
vocacy of the legal profession, the reforms intended in this legislative
action can never come to fruition. Individual homeowners, often isolated
from vital legal information concerning their rights, need vigorous in-
volvement to better guarantee a safe and decent residence, a basic right
for all people, not only for the benefit of those who choose to live in con-
ventional site-built housing.
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